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ABSTRACT
A default in its debt obligations compels a sovereign borrower to adopt
drastic measures in order to contain a spiraling financial crisis. One of
such steps is to restructurea debt which is in default. Every sovereign debt
restructuringresults in considerable loss to the claims of the bondholders,
therefore, equitable measures must be adopted during debt restructuringto
ensure that sovereigns do not misuse the restructuringprocess to their advantage, otherwise termed 'debtor moral hazard.' But, recent spate of
restructurings,especially by Latin American countries, like Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay, have seen ingenious use of collective action
clauses (CACs), whereby a predefined majority of creditors allow the sovereign debtor to restructure the debt with considerable ease, as opposed to
the traditionalnorm of seeking a unanimous consent. It has been argued
that a country in genuine financial hardship would face enormous difficulty to restructure its debt with unanimous consent had it not been for the
use of CACs. Whether the use of CACs actually promotes an equitable
restructuringor provides a heavy bargainingchip in favor of the sovereign
debtor is debatable. But, drafting of restructured bond contracts with
CACs do push the sovereign bond investors to a corner; bondholders are
mostly left with no choice than to agree to the restructuringand forego a
part of their claim in the hope of salvaging whatever they can from the
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deal, lest they are left out. This paper studies four major bond contractsArgentina & Uruguay (exchange offers) and Brazil & Mexico (fresh issuances), which have included CACs in them, to study their legal implications
on bondholders' rights vis-d-vis their claims against the sovereign debtor.
"When it becomes necessary for a state to declare itself bankrupt, in
the same manner as when it becomes necessary for an individual to do so,
a fair, open, and avowed bankruptcy is always the measure which is both
least dishonourable to the debtor and least hurtful to the creditor."1
I.

INTRODUCTION

DAM Smith's quote above could not be any better placed. As
economic recession in the world following the sub-prime crisis
becomes more and more prominent, the realities of bankruptcy
are staring corporations in the face and it will not be long before the
impact is transmitted to the State as a sovereign borrower. This is not to
say that the risk of default by sovereign borrowers has emerged only now;
it had always remained ever since sovereigns began to borrow from nonconventional commercial sources.
With the increase in global liquidity and market integration, the international financial markets witnessed new investment opportunities.
While investors struggled for maximum returns and diversified
risks-which created demand and liquidity for novel financial products-the developing countries, or emerging markets, matched this demand by exploiting different ways to access much needed international
capital. 2 During the world debt crisis of the 1980s, commercial bank syndicates held the majority of sovereign debts. 3 Sovereign borrowers began
to meet their debt requirements from international financial markets during later stages, which offered an easy and accessible option for countries
with scarce capital sources. 4 But the capital markets were volatile and
borrowing countries were exposed to unstable financial risks, and they
often defaulted on their debt obligations. This resulted in countries having to manage their debt either by way of immature debt satisfaction or
debt rescheduling. Paying up was not always a viable option and
rescheduling or restructuring of the debt was being opted for in a more
aggressive way.
1.

ADAM SMITH. AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 413 (Mortimer J. Adler ed., William Benton 1952) (1776).
2. JOCHEN ANDRITZKY, SOVEREIGN DEFAULT RISK VALUATION: IMPLICATIONS OF
DEBT CRISES AND BOND RESTRUCTURINGS 3 (Springer 2006).

3. See generally Lee C. Buchheit & Mitu Gulati, Sovereign Bonds and the Collective
Will, 51 EMORY L.J. 1317 (2002).
4. See Jose Garcia-Hamilton, The Required Threshold to Restructure Sovereign Debt,
27 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 249 (2005); see also Lee C. Buchheit, Sovereign Debtors and Their Bondholders. UNITARY TRAINING PROGRAMMES ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS, Doc. No. 1, 2000. "As a result of the Brady Plan,
most of the emerging market debt held by private investors is now in the form of
bonds, not in commercial bank loans."
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The effects of issuing public debt, both domestic and external have
been the subject of substantial scrutiny and analysis.5 A series of sovereign defaults and restructurings spanning the two decades from 1980 to
2000 have thrown open an interesting challenge to debtors, investors, academicians, and lawyers alike. The enormous consequences of mismanaging international public debt have generated significant scrutiny and
analysis. A general consensus seems to have emerged that sovereign debt
restructuring mechanisms need to be more orderly and economical.
While workable mechanisms of rescheduling sovereign debt obligations
have since emerged, the procedures employed entail the creditors to
share the burden of reduction of their claims against their investments.
Sovereign issuers have devised ways to legally reduce their debt obligations, and the investors, having not many viable alternatives to realize
their investments in full, are being left with no choice other than accept
whatever is in offer to them. This raises critical questions regarding the
mechanisms employed by sovereigns to handle the debt they have been
successful in mismanaging due to which investors have to suffer. Debt
instruments are being loaded with legal facilitators (the collective action
clauses, exit consents, etc.) that allow the debtor to lessen their debt bur6
den with considerable ease, albeit at the cost of their creditworthiness.
This paper is an analysis of the legal implications of including collective
action clauses (CACs) in sovereign bond contracts and their impact on
investors. The study examines sovereign debt 'exchange offers' [of Argentina (2005) & Uruguay (2003)] where the debt issuer or debtor announces an option to its creditors or bondholders whereby the
bondholders may offer their existing bonds which will then be exchanged
for new bonds with altered terms and conditions, usually with relaxed
payment schedules. Offer documents of fresh bond issues of emerging
countries [Brazil (2003) & Mexico (2003)] have also been examined for
the unique nature of the legal clauses used, which are discussed later in
the paper. Other exchange offers by Pakistan (1999), Ecuador (2000),
Russia (2006), Belize (2007), and Peru (2007) have also been studied in
detail to understand the way in which the issuers have utilized CACs and
have restructured their debts successfully. Table 1 below gives the details
7
of the bonds documents analyzed for this paper.
5. Kevin Cowan et.al., Sovereign Debt in the Americas: New Data and Stylized Facts
1-2 (Central Bank of Chile, Working Paper No. 371, 2006).
6. Although a country's creditworthiness plays an important role in its borrowing
capacity, the measure and accuracy of creditworthiness is now being viewed with
serious doubt. The UN has recently expressed its anguish over the dismal performance of credit rating agencies (CRAs) and questioned the wisdom of relying
on the CRA opinions for making investment decisions. "The failure of big CRAs
to predict the 1997-1998 Asian crisis and the recent bankruptcies of Enron,
WorldCom and Parmalat has raised questions concerning the rating process and
the accountability of CRAs and has prompted legislators to scrutinize rating agencies." Marwan Elkhoury, Credit Rating Agencies and Their Potential Impact on
Developing Countries 2, United Nations Conference on Trade and Dev., Discussion Paper No. 186 (2008).
7. All documents referred to here are on record with the author.
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TABLE 1: BOND DOCUMENTS ANALYZED:

Nature of
Prospectus Date
Details of Bonds
Offer
Country
Argentina 8 Exchange Offer An aggregate of approximately 180
January 10, 2005
series of bonds were exchanged for
(i) Par bonds due December 2038,
(ii) Discount bonds due December
2033, (iii) Quasi-par bonds due
December 2045, and (iv) GDPlinked securities that expire in
December 2035.
Uruguay 9
Exchange Offer An aggregate of approximately 16
April 10, 2003
series of bonds were exchanged for
either: (a) Maturity Extension Alternative, or (b) Benchmark Bond
Alternative, involving the issuance of
one or more of 15 Maturity Extension Bonds and 3 Benchmark Bonds.
Belize 10

Exchange Offer An aggregate of approximately 13
series of bonds and two Insured
Loans were exchanged for U.S. Dollar Bonds due 2029.

December 18, 2006

Peru 1

Exchange Offer 9.125% U.S. Dollar-Denominated
Global Bonds due 2012 were
exchanged for U.S. $750,000,000
8.375% U.S. Dollar-Denominated
Global Bonds due 2016, or 8.75%
U.S. Dollar-Denominated Global
Bonds due 2033.
Fresh Issuance
U.S. $1,000,000,000 10% Global
Bonds due 2007.

January 17, 2007

Fresh Issuance

February 26, 2003

Brazil 12
Mexico 13

U.S. $30,000,000,000 Global
Medium-Term Notes, Series A due
nine months or more from date of
issue; and U.S. $1,000,000,000
6.625% Global Notes due 2015
(Interest payable March 3 and September 3; Issue price: 97.637%). The
notes to mature on March 3, 2015.

April 29, 2003

8. The Republic of Argentina, Prospectus Supplement (to Prospectus dated
December 27, 2004), January 10, 2005.
9. Repdblica Oriental del Uruguay, Prospectus Supplement (to Prospectus dated
April 10, 2003), April 10, 2003.
10. Belize-Offer to Exchange, Offering Memorandum, December 18, 2006.
11. Republic of Peru Prospectus Supplement (to Prospectus, dated January 17, 2007).
February 15, 2007.
12. Federal Republic of Brazil, Prospectus Supplement (to Prospectus dated February
12, 2002), April 29, 2003.
13. Pricing Supplement (to Prospectus dated December 4, 2002 and Prospectus Supplement dated December 4, 2002), February 26, 2003.
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Pakistan 14

Exchange Offer

Any and all of (i) U.S. S150.000.000
11.5%0 Notes due 1999. (ii)
U.S.S160.000.000 6% Exchangeable
Notes due 20027. and (iii)
U.S.$300.000.000 Floating Rate
Notes due 2000 were exchanged for
U.S. Dollar Denominated 10% notes
due 2002 2005.

November 15. 1999

Ecuador 15

Exchange Offer

(i) Collateralized Par Bonds due
2025. (ii) Collateralized Discount
Bonds due 2025. (iii) Past due Interest Bonds due 2015. (iv) IE Bonds
due 2004. (v) 11.25% Fixed Rate
Eurobonds due 2002. (vi) Floating
Rate Eurobonds due 2004 w-ere
exchanged for. (i) U.S. S
2.700.000.000 U.S. Dollar Denominated Step-up Global Bonds due
2030- and (ii) U.S. S 1250.000.000
121o U.S. Dollar Denominated Stepup Global Bonds due 2012.

August 23. 2000

Russia 16

Exchange Offer

The U.S. S90-.788.786 Bonds due
March 31. 2007 to March 31. 2030
and U.S. $140_.34.766 Bonds due
March 31. 2006 to March 31. 2010
issued in connection with the Russian Federation's August 2000
London Club restructuring were further restructured either for cash payment or for altered payment dates
and interest rates.

November 23. 2006

A.

DEBT CON-TRACTS WIHI A SOVEREIGN STATE

Debt contracts with a sovereign state are characteristically different
from those with a corporation. In a debt contract with a corporation, the
parties are relatively easy to identify, there are negotiations between the
parties, and governing laws are clearly laid out (normally based on the
jurisdiction in which the corporation is registered). But multi-creditor
sovereign debt instruments are different and uncommon legal arrangements. 1- There is no international statute regulating sovereign debts.
Each sovereign has its own particular needs, thereby designing the debt
contract to suit the particular circumstances in which the country seeks to
borrow. WN-here sovereign bonds are traded as securities, the bonds keep
changing hands frequently and the bondholders may sometimes be widelv
dispersed across the globe, making it difficult to coordinate or communicate among issuer and bondholders. or among bondholders themselves.
Managing sovereign debt, therefore, is a very complex and time-involved
task.
14. The Islamic Republic of Pakistan - Offer to Exchange. Offering Memorandum.
November 15. 1999.
15. The Republic of Ecuador. Listing Particular Document. August 23. 2000.
16. Russian Federation. Prospectus. November 23. 2006.
17 . Buchheit & Gulati supra note 3. at 1230.
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As discussed earlier, emerging market economies constitute a sizeable
component of sovereign issuers who have restructured their bonds. Gelpern and Gulati have cited the following definition of emerging markets:
The Economist defines emerging markets as developing countries,
explained in turn as "[a] euphemism for the world's poor countries."
The term is also used occasionally to describe all countries with annual per capita income of below $10,725, classified as low- and middle-income by the World Bank. This excludes high-income or
"'mature market" issuers such as the United States and the other G-7
economies with well-established domestic financial systems, steady
access to domestic and international investors, and the capacity to
issue debt in their own currencies. We prefer a narrower definition
that reflects the fact that only a minority of all low-and middle-income countries have market access on any meaningful scale. J.P.
Morgan's Emerging Markets Bond Index Global (EMBIG) includes
U.S. -dollar-denominated debt instruments of governments and stateowned entities in thirty-three countries, for which dealers quote
18
prices daily.
With the opening of the new avenues of accessing finance through the
international capital markets, the number of emerging market sovereign
bond issuers has been on the rise; 19 evidently, therefore, they exhibit a
greater amount of restructuring activity. Emerging market debt is actively traded: a leading industry association reported annual trading volume at over $5.5 trillion in 2005, slightly below the historic high of $6
trillion reached in 1997.20 In addition, Catao and Kapur also mention
that many emerging markets are more volatile than both their advanced
counterparts and other developing country peers, and they tend to carry a
higher default risk and face a lower credit ceiling. 21 It is in the light of
these factors that this paper focuses on studying emerging market debt
exchanges.
Due to lack of rich and comparable cross-country data, economists
have faced some difficulty in proposing theoretical models to study the
impact of public debt and develop sophisticated techniques to measure
debt sustainability. 2 2 But, some commendable empirical studies have still
18. Anna Gelpern & Mitu Gulati, Public Symbol in Private Contract: A Case Study,
84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1627, 1633 (2007).

19. Andrea Zazzarelli et al., Sovereign Default and Recover Rates, 1983-2006, GLOBAL
CREDIT RESEARCH, MOODY'S INVESTOR SERVICES 4 (2007). Some of the identified sources of cross-country data on public debt mentioned by the authors are:
the International Financial Statistics (IFS) published by the International Monetary Fund and the World Development Indicators (WDI) and Global Development Finance (GDF) published by the World Bank. Data on smaller set of
countries are also available from the UN Economic Commission for Latin
America (ECLAC) and from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The authors are quick to add, though, that all these sources
present several important drawbacks.
20. Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 18, at 9.
21. Luis Catdo & Sandeep Kapur, Missing Link: Volatility and the Debt Intolerance
Paradox25 (International Monetary Fund Working Paper No. WP/04/51, 2004).
22. Cowan, supra note 5, at 2.
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been carried out to study sovereign debt and its various features. 2 3 Some
of these studies have been considered in this paper to understand the
level of adverse effect, if any, on sovereign debt investors.

B.

MANAGING SOVEREIGN DEFAULT

Makipaa has categorized sovereign debt into four categories-debt
owed to International Finance Institutions, bilateral loans to governmental creditors, commercial loans to banks, and private loans owed to bondholders. 24 Emerging market debts studied in this paper are those dealing
with multiple creditor classes including numerous private sector creditors
(banks, bondholders, multilaterals, suppliers) in their portfolios. A sovereign generally issues its debt in the form of sovereign bonds. Such bonds,
as opposed to municipal or corporate bonds, are issued by a national government. Default is sometimes referred to as an event in which the sovereign has insufficient assets to pay either the debt or any of its periodical
payments of interest on the debt, or an event where the debtors cashflows or asset-liability ratio falls below a sustainable level, or a situation
where any of the events defined as an 'event of default' has occurred.
Moody's defines both sovereign and corporate issuers as defaulting
25
when either of the following happens:
1. Issuer misses or delays disbursement of interest and/or principal.
2. A debt exchange is announced, where:
a) The issuer offers bondholders a new security or package of securities that amounts to a diminished financial obligation such as new debt
instruments with a lower coupon or par value; or
23. See generally Barry Eichengreen & Ashoka Mody, Would Collective Action
Clauses Raise Borrowing Costs? (Ctr. For Int'l and Dev. Econ. Research, Paper
Coo-114, 2000), available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/iber/cider/COO-114;
Torbjorn Becker, Anthony Richards & Yunyong Thaicharoen, Bond Restructuring
and Moral Hazard: Are Collective Action Clauses Costly? 127-161 (Int'l Monetary
Fund, Working Paper No. WP/01/92, 2001); Mark Gugiatti & Anthony Richards,
Do Collective Action Clauses Influence Bond Yields? New Evidence from Emerging Markets (Reserve Bank of Australia, Research Discusion Paper No. 2003-02,
2003): Liz Dixon & David Wall, Collective Action Problems and Collective Action
Clauses, FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW 142, June 2000; Olivier Jeanne & Jeromin
Zettelmeyer, The Mussa Theorem (and Other Results on IMF Induced Moral Hazard) (Int'l Monetary Fund Research Dept., Preliminary Draft, 2004); Paolo Mauro,
Nathan Sussman & Yishay Yefeh, Emerging Market Spreads: Then Versus Now,
Q. J. ECON. 695, May 1, 2002; Zhang: X. A. Zhang, Testing for 'Moral Hazard" in
Emerging Markets Lending (Inst. of Int'l Fin., Working Paper No. 99-1, 1999);
Timothy Lane & Steven Phillips, Does IMF Financing Result in Moral Hazard?
(Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/00/168, 2000); Giovanni
Dell'Ariccia, Isabel Schnabel & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Moral Hazard and International Crisis Lending: A Test (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/02/
181, 2002).
24. Arttu Makipaa, Bankruptcy Proceduresfor Sovereign Debtors, University of Heidelberg (2003), available at http://archiv.ub.uniheidelberg.de/volltextserver/
volltexte/2003/3432/pdf/BankruptcyProcedures-forSovereignDebtors.pdf.
25. Zazzarelli, supra note 19, at 5.
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b) The exchange had the apparent purpose of helping the borrower
avoid a 'stronger' event of default (such as a missed interest or principal
payment).
According to Moody's, a sovereign default occurs whenever a country
defaults on any of its bonds. Standard & Poor's (S&P) defines default as
the failure of a borrower to meet principal or interest payment of its debt
obligations on the due date.2 6
Sovereign defaults are rarely outright and are usually a political decision influenced by macroeconomic factors such as currency crisis, natural
27
calamity or disaster, balance of payment, central bank reserves, etc.
When a sovereign defaults on its bonds, it is forced to restructure its debt
whereby the debtor and the creditors agree to reduce (or postpone) the
debt payments. See Table 2 below for a summary of some of the sovereign bond default volumes and probable circumstances surrounding the
default.
TABLE 2: CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF SOVEREIGN
BOND-DEFAULT VOLUMES AND CIRCUMSTANCES
28
SURROUNDING THE DEFAULTS

Year

Country

Total
Defaulted Debt
(U.S. $ million)

Comments

Nov-98

Pakistan

1,627

Pakistan missed an interest payment but
cured the default subsequently within the
grace period (within 4 days). Shortly,
thereafter, it defaulted again and resolved
that default via a distressed exchange which
was completed in 1999.

Aug-98

Russia

72,709

Missed payments first on local currency
Treasury obligations. Later a debt service
moratorium was extended to foreign
currency obligations issued in Russia but
mostly held by foreign investors.
Subsequently, failed to pay principal on
MINFIN III foreign currency bonds. Debts
were restructured in August 1999 and
February 2000.

Sep-98

Ukraine

1,271

Moratorium on debt service for bearer bonds
owned by anonymous entities. Only those
entities willing to identify themselves and
convert to local currency accounts were
eligible for debt repayments, which
amounted to a distressed exchange.

26. J. Chambers & D. Alexeeva, Rating Performance,2002, Default, Transition,Recovery and Spreads, Standard & Poor's (2002).
27. Miao Di, PricingSovereign Bonds, DEPARTMENT OF MATHEMATICS & STATISTICS
AT MCMASTER UNIVERSITY 1 (2005).
28. Zazzarelli, supra note 19, at 10.
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Jul-98

Venezuela

Aug-99

270

Defaulted on domestic currency bonds in
1998, although the default was cured within a
short period of time.

Ecuador

6,604

Missed payment was followed by a distressed
exchange; over ninety percent of bonds wvere
restructured.

Sep-00

Peru

4,870

Peru missed payment on its Brady Bonds but
subsequently paid approximately U.S. $80
million in interest payments to cure the
default, within a thirty day period.

Jan-00

Ukraine

1,064

Defaulted on DM-denominated Eurobonds
in February 2000 and defaulted on USD
denominated bonds in January 2000. Offered
to exchange bonds with longer term and
lower coupon. The conversion was accepted
by a majority of bondholders.

Nov-01

Argentina

82,268

Declared it would miss payment on foreign
debt in November 2001. Actual payment
missed on January 3, 2002. Debt was
restructured through a distressed exchange
offering where the bondholders received
haircuts of approximately 70%.

Jun-01

Moldova

145

Missed payment on the bond in June 2001
but cured default shortly thereafter.
Afterwards, it began gradually buying back
its bonds, but in June 2002, after having
bought back about 50% of its bonds, it
defaulted again on remaining U.S. $70
million of its outstanding issue.

Apr-03

Uruguay

5,744

Contagion from Argentina debt crisis in 2001
led to a currency crisis in Uruguay. To
restore debt-sustainability, Uruguay
completed a distressed exchange with
bondholders that led to extension of maturity
by five years.

Apr-05

Dominican
Republic

1,622

After several grace period defaults (missed
payments cured within the grace period), the
country executed an exchange offer in which
old bonds were swapped for newx bonds with
a five-year maturity extension, but the same
coupon and principal.

Dec-06

Belize

242

Belize announced a distressed exchange of its
external bonds for new bonds due in 2029
with a face value of U.S. $ 546.8. The nex
bonds are denominated in U.S. dollars and
provide for step-up coupons that have been
set at 4.25% per annum for the first three
years after issuance. When the collective
action clause in one of Belize's existing
bonds is taken into account. the total amount
covered by this financial restructuring
represents 98.1% of the eligible claims.
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As noted above, there is no international statute that is applicable to all
sovereign defaults, unlike the various bankruptcy codes of several nations
for corporate defaults. 29 There are quite a few instances where sovereign
defaults were cured or averted through large-scale assistance from international financial institutions.3 0 So far the prevalent method of sovereign
debt defaults has been bail-outs by the international financial institutions
(like the International Monetary Fund), but lender moral hazard was perceived as the undesired aspects of the system. To contain lender moral
hazard, analysts suggested 'bailing-in,' or involving the private sector, to
bear part of the burden when countries encounter debt-servicing
problems and approach the international financial institutions for assistance. 3 1 In this way reforms in the international financial architecture
were brought about to debt managements. Proponents of debt buy-back,
exchange offers, and voluntary debt reductions methods argue that the
benefit of this method is that "debtors can improve their financial welfare" and handle debt crisis "by capturing a part of the discount at which
their debt trades in the secondary market. '3 2 But debt contracts specify
payment schedules that might get difficult to honor in toto.
Three major approaches were put forward for sovereign debt
33
restructuring:
1. Establishment of a statutory framework for International Bankruptcy. This approach contemplates an internationally recognized statute
in the form of 'Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism' (SDRM) pro34
posed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
29. A corporate debtor engaged in reorganization under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code
can rely upon the feature of the Code that allows a qualified majority of creditors
of a class to bind any dissenting members of that class. See U.S. Bankruptcy Code,
11 U.S.C. § 1129(b). Sovereign debtors, of course, do not have the benefit of a
national bankruptcy codes.
30. "For example, Mexico was given a $50 billion loan from the United States Treasury, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Bank for International Settlements, and the Bank of Canada during the Mexican Peso crisis of 1994. Such a
'bailout' of private creditors by the official sector, though suboptimal in many respects, was seen as necessary in the absence of a viable alternative means of crisis
resolution." Sonke Haseler, Collective Action Clauses in InternationalBond Contracts: Whence the Opposition? 2 (Institute of Land and Economics at the University of Hamburg, MPRA Paper No. 6314, 2007), available at http://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/6314.
31. Torbjorn Becker et al., Bond Restructuring and Moral Hazard: Are Collective Action Clauses Costly?, 61 J. INT'L ECON. 128 (2003) (IMF Working Paper No. WP/
01/92), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.cfm?sk=15178.0).
32. Sankarshan Acharya & Ishac Diwan. Sovereign Debt Buybacks as a Signal of
Creditworthiness1 (Int'l Econ. Dep't, The World Bank, Working Paper Series No.
WPS 318, 1989); John Drage & Catherine Hovaguimian, Collective Action Clauses
(CACS): An Analysis of Provisions Included in Recent Sovereign Bond Issues, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE DIVISION, BANK OF ENGLAND 3 (2004), available at www.
bankofengland.co.uk/publications/fsr/2004/fsrl7art9.pdf. See Table 3-A and 3-B
above for data on governing law.
33. Randal Dodd, Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 9 FINANCIER 1, 3-4 (2002).
34. Anne Krueger, A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring,INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND (2002).
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2. Voluntary and contractual arrangements such as exchange offers,
collective action clauses, and other devices. 3 5
3. A third proposal, from Kunibert Raffer and others, adapts U.S. sovereign bankruptcy laws, known as 'Chapter 9', to the needs of developing
36
countries.

The focus of this paper is on the second approach of utilizing contractual methods of debt management by way of an exchange offer, where
the sovereign debtor issues a new security laced with CACs, in exchange
for existing bond instruments which have either defaulted or which the
issuer perceives definitely to default in the near future.
C.

EXCHANGE OFFERS AND

CACs

Most sovereign bonds issued by emerging markets follow either New
37
York law or English law documentation (see Table 3-A or 3-B below).
While bonds issued under English law usually had the opportunity to
amend bond provisions with a majority voting system, 38 bonds governed
under New York law would provide that payment terms of the bond
could be amended only with the consent of each bondholder affected
thereby. 39 Thus, a 100% unanimous consent was required to restructure
key payment terms of a sovereign debt. This meant that when the bond
issuer defaulted on its bonds, the actions of any one bondholder could
dramatically affect the interests of all the other lenders. 40 Predictably,
this was quite difficult to achieve and bond contract drafters sought for
newer and easier methods to draft bond contracts to by-pass the unanimous consent requirement.

35. Alinna Arora & Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, Rethinking The Sovereign Debt RestructuringApproach, 9 LAW & Bus. REV. AM. 629, 637 (2003).

36. Dodd, supra note 33, at 4.
37. Becker, supra note 31.
38. Philip Bond & Hilya Eraslan, Debt Restructuring and Voting Rules 1 (Rodney L.

White Center for Fin. Res.,Wharton Sch., U. of Pa., Working Paper No. 23-05,
2005).
39. This was the view held by issuers before 2003, when debts started to be issued
under New York law with majority action provisions.
40. See Michael M. Chamberlin, At the Frontier of Exit Consents, Remarks of
Michael M. Chamberlin at the Bear Stearns & EMCA Sovereign Creditors Rights
Conference (Nov. 8, 2001).
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TABLE 3-A: EMERGING MARKET BOND ISSUANCE BY
CURRENCY AND GOVERNING LAW, 1990 - AUGUST 200041
GOVERNING LAW

New
Currency

Hong

England

York

UK Pound

17

2

0

US Dollar

752

812

Japanese
Yen

94

Japan German

Luxembourg

Switzerland

Kong

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

19

0

3

8

0

5

0

0

0

60

1640

11

249

0

2

0

0

0

0

0

0

356

Austria Spain

Italy Other

Total

Deutsche
Mark

27

5

0

142

9

0

0

0

0

0

0

183

Euro

79

23

0

42

6

0

0

0

0

3

1

154

Swiss
Franc

0

1

0

0

0

16

0

0

0

0

0

17

HK Dollar

27

1

0

0

0

0

10

0

0

0

1

39

schilling

5

0

0

0

0

0

0

13

0

0

0

18

Spanish
peseta

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

11

0

0

11

Austrian

Italian lira
Total

30

16

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

2

48

1031

871

249

187

25

16

15

13

11

3

64

2485

Bonds

TABLE 3-B: FOREIGN CURRENCY SOVEREIGN BOND
42
ISSUANCE BY GOVERNING LAW 1994-2004 ($ BILLION)
Governing
Law

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004 to
30 Sept.

New York
(with CACs)

13.1

7.1

21.3

22

18

22.2

34.7

37.2

36.3

46.7
(21.8)

33A
(31.1)

English
(with CACs)

25

26.8

30

17.9

12.5

14.2

14.4

21.4

27.4

5

5,8

7.7

1.5

4.9

2.1

26.7

26.2

Italian

4.6

10.3

3.8

7

11.4

German

7.2

5.9

12.4

7.8

8.1

8.6

4.7

0.9

0

0.5

1.8

Japanese
(with CACs)

4.6

3.9

9.2

2.1

0.1

0.7

5.5

4.2

0.2

0.4

0.9

Swiss

0.2

1.2

1.2

0.7

1.4

0.1

0.6

0.4

0.1

0.4

1.6

Luxembourg
(with CACs)

0.3

0.3

0.1

0.5

1.7

0.3

0

0

0

0

0

Other*

3.9

4.8

7.2

7.3

10.8

2.5

0

1

0.4

Total
% of total

60,6

59.7

80.2

74.1

79.6

57.3

63.7

64.9

53.4

74.7

74.4

with CACs

52.1

50.8

42.7

40

40

33

28.1

28.2

27.3

58.4

79.8

21.7

11.9

26.6

22.6

22.6

38.7

54.4

57.3

67.9

62.5

44.9

0.4

7.2**

% of total
issued under
NY Law

Source: Dealogic Bondware and IMF
* Other include: Austria, Canada, Columbia, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Korea, Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain, and other US issues.
** Includes foreign currency issues by Denmark, Finland and Korea, and by some Canadian provinces and
Crown Corporations in their own legal jurisdictions.

41. Becker, supra note 31.
42. Drage & Hovaguimian, supra note 32.
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Unanimity voting provisions make successful restructuring almost impossible and often hurtful to both the debtor and the creditor. To deal
with the unanimous voting and 'bail-in' issues, debt swap or exchange
offers offered a ready solution. In an exchange offer, or debt swap, an
offer is made to the creditors of sovereign bonds to offer their old bonds
to the issuer in return for restructured bonds usually with relaxed payment terms. 43 A restructured bond may include collective action clauses
in order to ward off the problems of unanimous voting and hold-out creditors. Various exchange offers were made by sovereign issuers to restructure debt that had either already defaulted or were most likely to default.
Ukraine announced its exchange offer for its bonds in 1999, Ecuador in
2000, Brazil and Uruguay in 2003, Argentina in 2005, and Russia in 2006.
There has been considerable debate over the use of CACs in bond contracts, which allow a qualifying majority of bondholders to agree to
restructure the payment terms on their bonds. 44 This majority decision of
amending bond terms ultimately become binding on dissenting bondholders. Analysts view CACs as a tool that could facilitate investor bail-ins in
the future, reduce the need for bail-outs by international financial institutions, and make the entire restructuring mechanism more swift and
orderly.
It has been argued that including CACs in a restructured bond can benefit both lenders and borrowers because the value of a restructured bond
is most likely to be greater than any amount that can be recovered from a
defaulted sovereign. This greater value is realized because CACs accord
some breathing space to the sovereign for their debt obligations, which in
turn facilitates the countries' output and make more resources available
to the debtor to service the debt. But the benefits of the CACs have been
viewed with quite some skepticism, and it has been argued that this could
lead to 'borrower moral hazard,' which means the easier it is to restructure a debt, the more the borrower would be prone to restructure it or
seek debt-reduction.
Further ahead we discuss the evolution and legal characteristics of
CACs used in sovereign debt exchange offers, the various provisions of a
bond contract that CACs seek to amend, and the implications of the same
on investor value of their claim against the issuer.

43. Details of some successful exchange offers can be found at the following IMF documents: Involving the Private Sector in the Resolution of Financial Crises-RestructuringInternational Sovereign Bonds, INT'L MONETARY FUND (2001),
available at www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/series/03/ips.pdf; Reviewing the Process
for Sovereign Debt Restructuringwithin the Existing Legal Framework, INT'L MONETARY FUND (2003) available at www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/sdrm/2003/080103.
pdf.
44. Becker, supra note 31.
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II. COLLECTIVE ACTION CLAUSES
A. TRACING CACs IN HISTORY
Even though the use of CACs for sovereign debt restructuring has been
initiated fairly recently, such clauses empowering majority members of a
group to act on behalf of all the members have been in existence for a
long time. Perhaps the prudence and efficiency of operation had necessitated collective decision making. Discussed below are some of the prominent proponents of CACs.
1. Palmer
The earliest use of CACs may be traced back to Francis B. Palmer in
his book Company Precedents which is a collection of corporate form
documents used in the courts of England and Wales. 45 Palmer recommended the use of such clauses in trust deeds and other documents of
debentures and debenture stock, and grouped such clauses under the
head "'power of majorities. "' 46 He claimed that "it was then a common
practice to give power to a specified majority of the holders to sanction
certain modifications of the rights of the (debenture) holders as a body",
stating the object of the clause to "protect the interest of the group
against unreasonable conduct of the minorities and to prevent deadlock
caused due to lack of unanimity which defeats a beneficial arrangement." - In order to strike the importance of including the clause into
corporate documents, Palmer wrote: ".
.indeed the draftsman who
omits to insert [majority action] provision runs the risk of being accused
of neglecting the best interests of the debenture or debenture stock
holders. -4
Palmer's majority action clauses must have caught up fast as he continues to rave about it in at least until the eighth edition of the book, and it
was also incorporated in commercial transactions as evidenced by the
number of cases cited by Palmer where the clause was in question.49
2. G-1O Working Group

Following an intense meeting of the Governors and Ministers of the G1050 in Halifax in 1995, a Working Group was formed to formulate policies for an orderly sovereign liquidity crisis so that the large scale rescue
packages did not become a precursor to moral hazard. In 1996, the
Working Group came out with a report, often referred to as the 'Rey
45. Lee Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati. Sovereign Bonds and the Collective Will. 51 ENIOR- LJ. 1317, 1325 (2002).
46. FR_ _'Ncis B. PALMER. COMPA_\N

4-.
48.
49.
50.

PRECEDENrs 397 (12th ed., Francis B. Palmer &

C. Macnaghten eds. 1922).
Palmer. supra note 46. at 152.
Palmer. supra note 46. at 153.
Palmer. supra note 46. at 150-160.
Consists of France. Germany. Belgium, Italy. Japan, the Netherlands. Sweden, the
United Kingdom. the United States and Canada. with Switzerland playmig a minor
role. For more on G-10, see http.:--w.bis.org/pubbgl0.htm.
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Report,' 5 1 which basically concluded that the best way to address the
moral hazard issue was to make modest changes to the institutional
framework (as against establishing an international sovereign bankruptcy
court) and recommended the use of majority voting clauses in international bond contracts. 52 The Rey Report recommended collective 'representation' clauses to facilitate coordination and qualified majority voting
to by-pass the unanimity requirement to amend the bond terms.
Further, the G-10 Working Group on Contractual Clauses was formed
in June 2002 in order to promote the development of suitable contractual
provisions. This Working Group recommended that majority amendment
clauses be included in sovereign bonds to permit a supermajority of bondholders to amend the payment terms of the bond.5 3 The Working Group
termed this clause as critical because it "provide[d] flexibility in reaching
agreement on the terms of a restructuring that debtors and creditors find
54
to be in their collective interest."
3. John B. Taylor
One of the earliest proponents of using majority action clauses in bond
contracts was John B. Taylor, former U.S. Under-Secretary of Treasury
for International Affairs.5 5 In his remarks, Taylor proposed a "decentralized, market-oriented" approach in order to facilitate a more orderly and
predictable debt restructuring. 56 Taylor advocated the use of a super-majority strength of bondholders as against a unanimous decision making
57
process prevalent in bond contracts.
4.

Buchheit, Gulati, Eichengreen, Portes, and others

The contribution of academics, economists, analysts, and lawyers can58
not be ignored when tracing the evolution of CACs. G. Mitu Gulati,
along with Stephen Choi, Ashoka Mody, 59 Anna Gelpern, 60 and various
51. After Jean-Jacques Rey of Belgium, who headed the G-10 Working Group in 1996.
52. Group of Ten Working Group, The Resolution of Sovereign Liquidity Crises: A
Report to the Ministers and Governors Prepared Under the Auspices of the Depu-

ties, 15-17 (1996), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/gten03.htm. Also known as
the 'Rey Report' after Jean-Jacques Rey of Belgium.
53. Group of Ten Working Group, Report of the G-1O Working Group on Contractual

Clauses 3 (2002), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/gten08.htm.
54. Id.

55. Andritzky, supra note 2, at 66.
56. John B. Taylor, Under-Secretary of Treasury for International Affairs, Sovereign
Debt Resturcturing: A U.S. Perspective, Remarks at the Conference on Sovereign
Debt Workouts: Hopes and Hazards, Discussion Paper, International Economics
(Apr. 2,2002), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/po2056.htm.
57. "Currently, the clauses in many bonds require the consent of 100% of bondholders
to change the financial terms.... In contrast, majority action clauses allow a super
majority-bondholders holding, for example, seventy-five percent rather than
100% of the principal-to agree to a restructuring. The decision of this super majority is binding on the minority." Id.
58. Professor of Law, Georgetown Law Center.
59. International Monetary Fund.
60. International Affairs Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, Washington D.C.
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others have also made significant academic contribution in analyzing different aspects of CACs. 6 1 There has also been considerable debate
among the IMF scholars, as can be seen by the number of academic pa62
pers published by IMF.
Eichengreen and Portes have carried out several empirical studies to
test the viability and effectiveness of CACs and advocate the use of CACs
in all sovereign debt loan agreements and bond indentures. 63 The New
York law firm, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton, which handles a lot of
sovereign clients and has represented Mexico and Uruguay, has been instrumental in drafting these clauses in quite a few sovereign debt exchanges. 64 Lee C. Buchheit, a senior partner at the firm, has been a
prolific advocate of CACs and was among the first to urge the use of
CACs and exit consents in sovereign debt restructuring. 6 5 Other prominent law firms involved in sovereign debt management have also made
some significant contributions. 66 Gelpern also mentions the contribution
of institutional investors and trade associations for the role they played in

augmenting the CACs cause. 67

61. See generally Becker, supra note 23; Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, Innovation in
Boilerplate Contracts: An Empirical Examination of Sovereign Bonds (Univ. of
Cal. Berkeley, Working Paper No. 40, 2004); Lee C. Buchheit, Choice of Law
Clauses and Regulatory Statutes, 15 INT'L FIN. L. REV. 3, 11-14 (1996); Gelpern,
supra note 18.
62. See generally Krueger, supra note 34; Kenneth M. Kletzer, Sovereign Bond Restructuring:Collective Action Clauses & Official Crisis Intervention (Int'l Monetary
Fund, Working Paper No. 03/134, Dec. 2002), available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/cat/longres.cfm?sk=16571.0; Legal Dept. of the Int'l Monetary Fund,
The Design and Effectiveness of Collective Action Clauses (Francois Gianviti ed.,
June 6, 2002) (unpublished)). "Collective action clauses can make a useful contribution to the resolution of debt problems... [t]he international community has
been urging emerging market countries to adopt collective action clauses for the
past five years, with very limited success." Anne Krueger, First Deputy Managing
Director, International Monetary Fund, Remarks at the Conference on Sovereign
Debt Workouts: Hopes and Hazards at the Institute for International Economics
(Apr. 1, 2002) available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2002/040102.
htm.
63. See generally BARRY EICHENGREEN, TOWARD A NEW INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
ARCHITECTURE-A PRACTICAL POST-AsIA AGENDA (Inst. for Int'l Econ., 1999);
Barry Eichengreen & Richard Portes, Debt & Default in the 1930s: Causes & Consequences (NBER, Working Paper No. 1772, 1986); Eichengreen, supra note 23;
BARRY EICHENGREEN

64.
65.

66.

67.

& RICHARD PORTES,

CRISIS? WHAT CRISIS? ORDERLY

WORKOUTS FOR SOVEREIGN DEBTORS 109-10 (Centerfor Econ. Policy Res., 1995).
Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 18, at 1645-66.
See generally Lee C. Buchheit, The Collective Representation Clause, 17 INT'L FIN.
L. REV. 9 (1998); Lee C. Buchheit, How Ecuador Escaped the Brady Bond Trap,
19 INT'L FIN. L. REV. 17 (2000); Buchheit, supra note 17; Buchheit, supra note 3;
Breaking The Mold, LatinFinance, Dec. 2005, at 23-24..
Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, First Use of Collective Action Clauses, http://www.
sullcrom.com/practice/servicedetail.aspxfirmService=21&pdText=PDlnfoText3&
pdname=LR021969 (last visited Aug. 10, 2008); Arnold & Porter LLP, Firm Advises Brazil on Innovative $1 Billion Global Bond Issue, http://www.arnoldporter.
com/case.cfm?publicationID=743 (last visited Aug. 10, 2008); see Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 18, at note 89.
Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 18, at 1646.
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B.

INCLUDING

CACs

IN SOVEREIGN BONDS

Majority of sovereign bonds issued under New York law contained a
unanimous voting provision where changes to crucial financial terms of
the bonds could not be made without unanimous consent. With frequent
defaults and credibility of sovereign borrowers taking a hit, obtaining a
unanimous consent was almost impossible to obtain. The fact that bondholders were widely dispersed across the globe and communication with
each individual bondholder was extremely difficult did not help much.
Also, the bondholders of a single issue could be a heterogeneous group,
consisting of people with varied aspirations and financial plans and not
everyone could comfortably accept a restructuring plan. Compounded
with these is the problem of opportunism where some bondholders may
elect to withhold their consent to gain a bargaining high-position, which
68
could be likened to the classic prisoner's dilemma.
Sovereign borrowers issuing bonds governed by English and Japanese
law have been known to contain majority restructuring provisions, which
enable a qualified majority of bondholders to modify key financial terms
69
and to make that decision binding on all holders of a given bond issue.
Such majority amendment provisions are not common in bonds governed
by German law, and until recently they were generally not found in bonds
governed by New York law. Whereas until 1994, the number of sovereign
bonds issued with CACs governed by English law far exceeded those
under New York law, but by 2004, bonds under New York law were much
more than those under English law. 70 Eichengreen, Gelpern, and Gulati
do acknowledge that CACs had previously been used by other countries,
but since they were either not large enough or they were privately placed
under Rule 144A and exempted from registration with the SEC,7 1 not
much hype was created around them. 72 In 2003, however, Mexico issued
its bonds under New York law that contained CACs and has since attracted a lot of attention for discussion.
CACs are clauses in individual loan agreements and bond indentures
that enable, typically, a "supermajority" of creditors (i.e., some percentage of creditors higher than a simple "greater-than fifty-percent" majority) who are parties to any such contract to modify essential payment
terms-such as the amount of principal owed, the interest rate thereon,

68. Haseler, supra note 30.
69. Barry Eichengreen et al., Crisis Resolution: Next Steps 1, note 2 (Ctr. for Pac.
Basin Monetary and Econ. Studies, Econ. Research Dep't, Fed. Reserve Bank of
San Francisco, Pac. Basin Working Paper Series No. PB 03-05, 2003).
70. See Table 3-B: Foreign Currency Sovereign Bond Issuance by Governing Law
1994-2004.
71. Jorge M. Guira, Latin America at Undue Cost & Risk?, 4 Y.B. INT'L FIN. & ECON.
L. 430, 438 (1999).
72. Lebanon and Qatar in 2000 and Egypt in 2001. Eichengreen, supra note 69, at 1,
note 3; Bulgaria, Kazakhstan, Egypt, Lebanon, and Qatar. Gelpern, supra note 23,
at 1707.
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and maturities, etc. 73 Including a majority enforcement provision in the
bond contract provides crucial time and opportunity for the debtor to
seek more creditor cooperation when a qualified majority of bondholders
is able to limit the minority's ability to enforce their claims against the
default of the bonds. Various commentators, analysts, and policy-makers
advocate the use of CACs for sovereign borrowers who issue debt in in74
ternational financial markets in the form of bond indentures.
Some of the basic objectives of the growth and adoption of CACs in
75
sovereign bond contracts, as also identified by the G-10 working group,
are: to encourage coordination, negotiation, dialogue, and communication among the creditors and the debtor; to effectively handle hold-out
minority creditors who may block the entire transaction by choosing not
to participate; and to thwart legal enforcement actions by the hold-out
creditors so that the restructuring may take place without detrimental litigation. 7 6 Proponents of CACs have pointed out the various benefits of
including such majority action provisions in sovereign bond contracts so
77
that they facilitate bond restructurings. Some of them are listed below:
" The issuer has more flexibility in managing its crisis by modifying
payment dates, amounts, and interest rates and thus avoid being
forced to announce an exchange offer.
" CACs provide collective representation to bondholders in case of a
crisis. This aspect is crucial since all bondholders may not be able to
attend a joint meeting for several reasons, and their absence would
not hold up the proceedings.
" The issuer is in a better position to manage hold-out or rogue creditors who may not be willing to participate in the restructuring and
may disrupt the whole proceeding.
" Since CACs have the ability to bind all bondholders with the decision of the supermajority, the requirement of seeking individual consent from all bondholders is dispensed.
" Restructurings can be carried out both before and after default.

73. Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Bankruptcy Reorganization
Approach, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 956, 1014 (2000).
74. See generally Buchheit, supra note 17; Eichengreen, supra note 63, at 65-70; Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Mandate and Market: Contract Transition in the Shadow of
the InternationalOrder,53 EMORY L. J. 691-94 (2004); Taylor, supra note 56; Krueger, supra note 34; Group of Ten Working Group, supra note 53; Eichengreen,
supra note 63, at 103 (referencing Chirstopher Greenwood and Hugh Mercer's
section on Considerations of International Law).
75. Drage, supra note 32; Buchheit, supra note 65, at 11.
76. For a discussion on holdout creditors, see generally Steven L. Schwarcz, "Idiot's
Guide" to Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J 1189 (2004); Kentaro
Tamura, The Problem of Sovereign Debt Restructuring: How Can We Deal with
Holdout Problem Legally?, Harv. Law Sch., Int'l Fin. Seminar, Professors Hal
Scott & Howell Jackson (Apr. 30, 2002).
77. For various discussions, see generally Timothy Geithner, Franqois Gianviti & Gerd
Hausler, Collective Action Clauses in Sovereign Bond Contracts-Encouraging
Greater Use, Int'l Monetary Fund (June 6, 2002); Sovereign Debtors, supra note 4.
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" CACs protect the issuer from legal action of creditors who may wish
to enforce their claim against the bond in a court of law.
* CACs allow a qualified majority to vote for altering or amending the
terms of the bonds to suit particular crisis situations.
" If a debt restructuring using CACs can be carried out swiftly, it may
78
be able to limit the contagion effect.
C.

BOND INDENTURE PROVISIONS COVERED UNDER

CACs

1. Majority Restructuring or Majority Action Provisions
A majority action provision entitles a defined supermajority of bondholders to change the payment terms of the bond and make it binding for
all bondholders. These provisions also have the capacity to regulate the
decision making process of the bondholder community, including conduct
of meetings, quorum requirement for meetings, and voting threshold to
carry out an amendment in the bond terms. 79 They may also provide that
the issuer may restructure the entire bond issue by carrying out an exchange offer.
2.

Majority Enforcement or Non-Acceleration Provisions

Such clauses authorize the supermajority bondholders to make changes
in the terms of multiple bond issues of the same sovereign floating in the
market, which may be crucial for the issuer from a restructuring point of
view in provisions such as: calling of meetings, the acceleration clause, a
rescission of acceleration, the sharing clause, a negative pledge, disenfranchisement, delisting of the bond from stock exchange, waiver of sovereign immunity, waiver of legal enforcement of bondholder claims,
aggregation, collective representation modes, etc. These provisions help
to contain the cross-acceleration problem because a restructuring proposal of one bond may amount to default in another. All these changes
have the potential to discourage hold out creditors and other bondholders to impede the restructuring process.
3.

Majority Amendment Clause

Sovereign issuers carrying out bond exchanges have chosen different
threshold levels regulating voting parameters. Most of them have chosen
a 66.66% of the principal outstanding amount as the voting threshold to
alter non-payment terms, and seventy-five percent (G-10 recommendation) for payment terms. Crucial matters related to bond indenture have
been categorized under 'reserve matters' requiring the higher
supermajority threshold. Sovereign issuers with sub-investment grade
ratings have prescribed a higher threshold of eighty-five percent in order
78. Sean Hagan, Designing a Legal Frameworkto Restructure Sovereign Debt, 36 GEO.
J. INT'L L. 299, 339 (2005).
79. Haseler,supra note 30.
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to build investor confidence. 80 See Table 4 below for a summary of features of the bonds issued by Mexico (2003), Brazil (2003), Argentina
(2005), and Uruguay (2003).
TABLE 4. SUMMARY OF KEY FEATURES OF
SOVEREIGN BONDS: 8 1
Features

MEXICO

BRAZIL

Timing of
Restructuring

February 2003

April 2003

Offer Period

Fresh Issuance

Fresh Issuance

Bonds
Restructured

U.S.
$1,000,000,000
6.625% Global
Notes due
2015 for U.S.
$30,000,000,000
Global
Medium-Term
Notes, Series
A Due 2003.*
Fresh Issuance

Exit Consents

ARGENTINA

URUGUAY

December
2004-January
2005
Forty-seven
days (January
10, 2005 to
February 25,
2005)

April-May
2003

U.S.
$1,000,000,000,
10% Global
Bonds due
2007.*

152 series of
Bonds (worth
approx. U.S.
$95,000,000)
exchanged for
different
Bonds of 4
Series. *

Fifteen series
of Bonds
including three
benchmark
Bonds
exchanged for
Different
Bonds of 18
Series.*

Fresh Issuance

76.15%82

93%83

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Aggregation

No

No

Yes

Yes

CACs Included

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Permanent
bondholders'
representative
(trustee or
other)

No - Fiscal
agent

No - Fiscal
agent

Yes - Trustee

Yes - Trustee

Governing
Law/Jurisdiction

New York,
United States

New York,
United States

New York,
United States

New York,
United States

Participation
Result

Thirty-five
days (April 10,
2003 to May
15, 2003)

80. Drage & Hovaguimian, supra note 32, at 4.
81. Compiled variously from: Offer Documents of United Mexican States, Federative
Republic of Brazil, The Republic of Argentina and Repiblica Oriental del
Uruguay (on record with the author); Drage and Hovaguimian, supra note 32, at
15-28, app. A; Anna Gelpern, How Collective Action is Changing Sovereign Debt,
INT'L FIN. L. REV. at 22 (2003).
* For details, please see Prospectus/Offer Documents.
82. Gabriel Gomez-Giglio, A New Chapterin the Argentine Saga: The Restructuring of
the Argentine Sovereign Debt, 7 J. INT'L BANKING L. 345 (2005).
83. Hal S. Scott, Sovereign Debt Default: Crv for the United States, Not Argentina 4
(Wash. Legal Found. Critical Legal Issues, Working Paper No. 140 2006): Buchheit
and Pam, Uruguay's Innovations 2004.
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Waiver of Sovereign Immunity

Yes, but exceptions
84
included.

Has not agreed
to waive any
defense of sovereign immunity to which it
may be entitled in any
action other
than its immunity from jurisdiction in an
action to recognize an arbitral award or
in an action
brought85 in
Brazil.

Yes, but with
certain important excep86
tions.

Will not waive
immunity from
attachment
prior to judgment and
attachment in
aid of execution under
Uruguayan
law. Agrees
that this
waiver shall be
to the fullest
extent permitted under the
United States
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of
1976 and is
intended to be
irrevocable for
purposes 87of
that law.

Voting

With the
affirmative
vote (or written consent) of
the holders of
not less than
66.67% of the
outstanding
principal
amount of the
debt securities
of a series that
are represented at a
meeting
For reserve
matter - 75%
(aggregate).

Brazil may
amend certain
key terms of
the global
bonds, including the maturity date,
interest rate
and other payment terms,
with the consent of the
holders of not
less than 85%
of the aggregate principal
amount of the
outstanding 88
global bonds.

With the
affirmative
vote (or written consent) of
the holders of
not less than
66.67% of the
outstanding
principal
amount of the
debt securities
of a series that
are represented at a
meeting
For reserve
matter - 85%
(aggregate);
and 66.67% (of
that series
individually)

False modifications affecting
the reserve
matters may
be made to a
single series of
debt securities
issued under
the indenture
with the consent of the
holders of 75%
of the aggregate principal
amount outstanding of
that series
Where Uruguay proposes
an amendment
to the indenture: 85%
(aggregate)
and 66.67% (of
that series
individually).

84. United Mexican States, Prospectus Supplement to Prospectus dated Dec. 4, 2002,
at S-9 (Dec. 4, 2002).
85. Federative Republic of Brazil, Prospectus Supplement to Prospectus dated Feb. 12,
2002, at 11 (Apr. 28, 2003).
86. Republic of Argentina, Prospectus Supplement to Prospectus dated Dec. 27, 2004,
at S-31 (Jan. 12, 2005).
87. Reptiblica Oriental del Uruguay, Prospectus dated April 10, 2003, at S-4.
88. Prospectus Supplement, supra note 85, at S-1.
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Simple majority of holders
of aggregate
principal
amount (for
matters other
than reserve
matters).
75% for
reserve matters.
Non-payment
of thirty days,
cross default,
moratorium,
breach of
other obligations, and
validity.

Simple majority of holders
of aggregate
principal
amount (for
matters other
than reserve
matters).
75% for
reserve matters.

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yesalso adds that
if a change to
a reserved
matter is
sought as part
of exchange
then terms
must not be
less favorable
than those of
new notes (i.e.,
restriction on
use of exit
consents).
Yes - aggregation clause also
added.

Quorum for
Meetings

Simple majority of holders
of aggregate
principal
amount (for
matters other
than reserve
matters).
For reserve
matters - 75%.

Simple majority of holders
of aggregate
principal
amount.

Events of
Default (inter
alia)

Non-payment
of thirty days,
breach of
other obligations and not
acting within
thirty days of
notification by
any bondholder, cross
default with
external debt,
and moratorium on external debt.

Non-payment
of thirty days,
breach of
other obligations and not
acting within
thirty days of
notification by
any bondholder, cross
default with
external debt,
and moratorium on external debt.

Reserved matters 89 :

Yes

Majority action
provisions for
amendments to
non-reserved
matters

Yes

Non-payment
of thirty days,
breach of
other obligations of sixty
days, cross
default, moratorium, end of
IMF membership, etc.

89. Includes: (i) change the payment date; (ii) reduce the principal amount; (iii) reduce the portion of the principal amount due in the event of an acceleration; (iv)
reduce the interest rate; (v) change the currency or place of payment; (vi) change
the obligation of the issuer to pay additional amounts; (vii) change the definition
of outstanding or reduce the voting requirements; (viii) authorize the permanent
representative to exchange the bonds; (ix) instruct the permanent representative
to settle or compromise any proceeding; (x) give to any person the exclusive right
to enforce any provision; or (xi) appoint a negotiating representative for any proposed restructuring of the bonds; (xii) governing law, (xiii) jurisdiction, status;
(xiv) pari passu; (xv) events of default.
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Yes - allows
individual
action if trustee fails to act
within sixty
days of instruction.
Yes: 66.67%
can agree, also
specifies some
requirements
for remedy of
default.

Acceleration

Yes

Yes

Yes

Rescission of
acceleration
(provided
default is
cured)

Yes: 50% +
can agree if
default is remedied.

Yes: 66.67%
can agree if
default is remedied.

Yes: 50%+ can
agree if default
is remedied.

Agents

Citibank N.A.;
Kredietbank
S.A. Luxembourgeoise
(Luxembourg
Paying and
Transfer
Agent).

JPMorgan
Chase Bank;
J.P. Morgan
Bank Luxembourg S.A.
(Luxembourg
Listing Agent)

The Bank of
New York;
Georgeson
Shareholder
Communications Inc.
(information
agent);
Kredietbank
S.A. Luxembourgeoise
(Luxembourg
Listing Agent)

Citibank, N.A.;
The Bank of
New York

Stock
Exchange Listing

Luxembourg

Luxembourg

Luxembourg

Luxembourg

III.

BONDHOLDER CONCERNS WITH CACs

The incentives for individual investors to decide whether to participate
in a restructuring or to hold out in the hope of receiving more favorable
terms clearly depend on an evaluation of the extent to which a proposed
deal protects their individual interests and the likely payoffs of the alternative strategies in each case. 90 While exchange offers, including CACs,
may provide one of the remedies to the collective representation issue of
sovereign debt crisis management, they do have their disadvantages. Issuers making proposals of exchange offers not only have to keep in mind
the probability of success of the proposal, but they also have to consider
the factor of creditworthiness for future borrowing from public sources.
Inclusion of CACs has significant protection against maverick hold-out
and litigating creditors, but consenting creditors might view it as a disincentive if the terms of a restructured bond are too favorable to the issuer.
A sovereign issuer thus has to maintain a balance between the two in
order to achieve highest participation and retain their creditworthiness.
Buchheit and Gulati have discussed some of the important disadvantages of including CACs in a bond contract, some of which are listed
90. Franqois Gianviti, The Design and Effectiveness of Collective Action Clauses, INT'L
MONETARY FUND

at 14 (June 6, 2002).
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below. 9 1
1. CACs may be included only in new issues or by way of an exchange
offer, as most existing bonds do not have such provisions.
2. Even though the CACs have sought to eliminate the unanimous voting requirement, a supermajority is still required, and a group of dissenting creditors may still acquire a blocking holding to manipulate the issuer.
3. Each bond issue has a separate group of creditors, and CACs in a
particular contract can only cater to the creditors of that contract. Thus,
for a comprehensive exchange offer where the entire debt obligation of
the state is sought to be restructured, the sovereign effectively needs to
92
appeal to each bondholder separately.
93
4. Because bonds are issued in different jurisdictions and currencies,
creditors of different jurisdictions may not respond to the bond terms
offered in the exchange offer.
5. Even though a supermajority assigned for voting procedures of restructured bonds may preclude hold-out creditors from stopping a restructuring, their claims against the sovereign for the old securities that
they retain continue to remain and the sovereign is obliged to honor them
eventually.
6. Non-participation may not necessarily be due to deliberate holding
out, but may also be due to miscommunication, creditor apathy, or sheer
inertia. By excluding all non-participating creditors, the debtor may be
inclined to deliberately ignore those creditors who could not participate
for genuine reasons.
7. There is a general perception that it might take time for the market
to fully accept the new provisions, and the first issuer might be charged a
higher spread (the so-called 'first mover' problem).

A.

THE NUMBER GAME

Even though the issuer may have assigned a supermajority threshold to
compel dissenting creditors, this ability does not necessarily imply that
the decision has a majority representation. The different percentages employed while using CACs in an exchange offer are:
1. Quorum requirement for general bondholder meetings (usually a
simple majority above fifty percent or seventy-five percent for reserve

matters);94
2. Second quorum requirement for an adjourned meeting (twenty percent, as in Argentina)
91. Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 3.
92. Unless an aggregation method is adopted, as in the case of Uruguay and
Argentina.
93. Prominent in the case of Argentina.
94. Mexico (2003): simple majority + seventy-five percent for reserve matters; Brazil
(2003): simple majority; Argentina (2005): simple majority + seventy-five percent
for reserve matters; Uruguay (2003): simple majority + seventy-five percent for
reserve matters.
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3. Voting for ordinary matters (usually 66.67%);
4. Voting for reserve matters (seventy percent to eighty-five percent);
5. Dual voting thresholds for certain matters (for example, eighty-five
percent of the holders of aggregate principal amount and 66.67% of the
holders of that particular series, as in Uruguay);
6. Voting for accelerating the bond on default (twenty percent);
7. Voting for rescission of acceleration on default (usually fifty
percent);
8. Minimum representation required to initiate legal proceedings
against the issuer through a trustee (where there is a trustee as a permanent bondholder representative).
Even if the technical number requirements are met, there is no guarantee that the decision taken will have majority consent. For example, a
vote in an adjourned meeting where only thirty percent of the bondholders were present will be a valid resolution even though it has marginal
representation. Further, it is quite possible that few institutional investors own the supermajority fraction of bonds, and a bilateral negotiation
with the issuer may wean them into agreement, whereas a large number
of scattered individual creditors may not be able to make their voices
heard because they are scattered, unorganized, and singularly consider
themselves incapable of making a visible difference. This issue raises important questions regarding proportional representation while employing
CACs. Consider, also, that there is no uniformity in the international financial architecture about the voting thresholds employed by sovereign
issuers in debt exchanges.

B.

EXIT CONSENT

Exit consent is the novel feature of debt exchanges and is used in various sovereign debt restructuring. 95 While tendering their old bonds in
exchange for new bonds, the existing bondholders give their consent to
amend key terms of the old bonds that they would be exiting (hence the
term 'exit consent'). This type of consent becomes crucial for an issuer to
amend terms of the old bonds where the existing bond contract requires
unanimous consent for amendment. With the help of exit consents, the
issuer may amend key terms of the old bonds-like governing law, delisting from stock exchange, jurisdiction to domestic courts of the issuer,
etc.-to render the old bonds commercially unattractive to hold-out creditors. Creditors participating in the exchange offer will be more inclined
to give their consent to exit amendments since hold-out creditors are as
much a threat to the consenting creditors as to the issuer, as they may
96
hold the entire restructuring process ransom.
95. See Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 3. Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay
have all used exit consents in their restructured bond contracts. Some claim that
Buchheit is the father of 'Exit Consents.'
96. An exit consent clause employed in the Belize (2007) exchange offer: "CONSENT
TO AMENDMENTS: By tendering an Eligible Claim outstanding under Bear Stearns
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Exit consents/amendments have been challenged on their legal as well
as moral grounds. One of the criticisms is that it amounts to implicit coercion, insofar as any creditor who is unsure of participating will definitely be intimidated at the prospect of being left with the old bond
stripped of most of commercial value. Secondly, the fact that the consent
is given by creditors who are not going to remain party to the contract,
and thus affect the rights of those who will continue to hold the old
bonds, could amount to tort liability on the consenting creditors interfering with the rights of their brethren. 97 Furthermore, could one infer any
implied duty of one bondholder towards another, where the action of one
might affect the rights of the other?
Buchheit answers all these questions, arguing that the exit consents
successfully withstand these legal challenges. 98 He cites the judicial pronouncements in Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc. 99 and Kass v. E. Air Lines,
Inc.10 0 and makes the point that there is no fiduciary duty between the
debtor and the creditors because the relationship is contractual and incentivizing the consenting bondholders or threatening the dissenting ones
with exit amendments does not amount to coercion. He also argues that
it would be extremely difficult for dissenting bondholders to prove a
claim based on tort, as they would have to prove that the consenting
bondholders had implied liability towards the dissenting ones.
Although Buchheit makes very strong points establishing the legal validity of exit amendments, one wonders what then happens to the claims
of the non-participating bondholders. The judicial pronouncements he
cites in favor of his arguments, besides being more than two decades old,
relate to corporate restructurings. It is yet to be seen if these arguments
would hold up in a proceeding brought about by a dissenting sovereign
bondholder. The factor of coercing dissenting bondholders using exit
consents has the effect of impairing their legal rights since they would not
have many viable alternatives left if they did not participate. Once the
bond is successfully restructured, it is likely to lose its commercial value,
notwithstanding the limited scope of a potential outcome from litigation
against the sovereign issuer. Also, with such a strong legal instrument in
the hands of sovereign borrowers, the problem of debtor moral hazard is
bound to escalate.

97.
98.
99.
100.

9.75% Notes due 2015, each holder thereof will irrevocably consent to amendments to the Bear Stearns 9.75% Notes due 2015 that would have the effect of
conforming the maturity date and interest rate, and making certain related amendments to the Bear Stearns 9.75% Notes due 2015. If the voting requirements
under this series are met, the amendments to the series will take effect at the closing of the Offer on the Closing Date." Belize-Offering Memorandum at 26.
Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 3, at 75.
Id. at 72.
Katz v. Oak Indust., Inc., 508 A.2d 873 (Del. Ch. 1986).
Kass v. E. Air Lines, Inc., 12 Del. J. Corp. L. 1074 (1986).
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C.

AGGREGATION

Although carrying out an exchange offer might sound simple, it gets
more complicated when a sovereign has multiple bond instruments floating simultaneously in the market. Even when the issuer is able to convince the creditors of one of the issues to agree to the restructuring, a
group of creditors might still be able to acquire a holding position in some
other issue of the same sovereign. With aggregation, this problem could
be resolved. The issuer with multiple issues outstanding may restructure
all the bonds together. In this way even if one of the bond issue does not
receive the required participating percentage, there is a good chance that
the restructuring may go through successfully if the issuer is able to
achieve the aggregate participating percentage in all the bonds being restructured together. 10 1 Aggregation has a dual benefit for the issuer-not
only does it help in managing the threshold requirements, but also makes
it difficult for hold-out creditors to acquire a blocking position. Aggregation is a useful innovation used in the Uruguay restructuring.
Due to aggregation, the hold-outs will now have to acquire a blocking
percentage of the aggregate of the all the issues being restructured in
order to impede the proposal. Even if it were to acquire a blocking position in one series, it would still not be able to stop the participating bondholders from changing their instruments. 10 2 Ukraine, Argentina, and
Uruguay successfully employed the aggregation method to restructure
their bonds. It is still to be seen if aggregation could be used to restructure bonds issued simultaneously in different jurisdictions. In Uruguay's
case, the aggregation voting threshold was eighty-five percent, and a
blocking position could be created only by acquiring fifteen percent of
the all the issues. This is still difficult to achieve as against acquiring
twenty-five percent of a single series if the threshold was seventy-five percent. In effect, aggregation could prove to be another potent tool in the
hands of the issuer to consolidate all its outstanding debts and restructure
them in one fell swoop. This diminishes the scope of individual bondholder's right to stake its claim and make its voice heard during a massive
aggregate restructuring. There have also been suggestions that debtors
have to offer higher spreads where they have larger amount of multiple
10 3
issues outstanding.
D.

GOVERNING LAW

The law under which the bond contract is governed is another important factor having commercial implications. The governing law clause im101. See Anna Gelpern, How Collective Action is Changing Sovereign Debt, IN-1L FIN.
L. REV. 19 (2003) (an example of aggregation).
102. Gianviti, Francois, ed., The Design and Effectiveness of Collective Action Clauses,
Legal Department-International Monetary Fund, June 2002, available at http://
www.imf.org/external/np/psi/2002/eng/060602.htm.
103. See Barry Eichengreen & Ashoka Mody, Is Aggregation a Problem for Sovereign
Debt Restructuring?, AEA Papers and Proceedings May 2003, available at http://
www.iadb.org/res/centralBanks/publications/cbm34-170.pdf.
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plies submission of the debtor to the jurisdiction of the courts of the
country whose laws govern the contract. Bonds governed under English
and New York law are the most widely used because the interpretation of
international financial agreements are remarkably similar and most standard credit agreements will be enforceable under the laws of either

place. 114 These two jurisdictions have created a reputation in the interna-

tional financial system by following a rich system of judicial precedents
10 5
and a robust judicial system.
Most sovereign bonds are issued under either English law or New York
law. 10 6 But upon restructuring, a sovereign issuer might amend the governing law provision to subject the bond contract to its domestic jurisdiction. If a borrower is not domiciled in the country of the law governing
the agreement it has to appoint an agent in the relevant jurisdiction to
carry out the legal proceedings on its behalf. This procedure can be a
tedious and time consuming affair. Furthermore, it can prove quite
daunting to obtain a judgment against a country in its domestic courts.

E.

DISENFRANCHISEMENT

One of the amendments that may be brought about in the restructured
bond is disenfranchisement. This disentitles a group of bonds from consideration for voting and quorum purposes where those bonds are owned
or controlled directly or indirectly by the issuer or its public sector instrumentalities. Mexico included the disenfranchisement provision in its 2003
restructuring. This feature has been widely adopted, albeit with a variation in language by introducing 'direct or indirect' control. 0 7 The Argentine restructuring was carried out effectively much below the seventy-five
percent threshold because a major portion of the Argentine domestic
debt was held by state owned-controlled entities. This has the effect of
considerably lowering the voting thresholds thereby increasing the
debtor's incentive to control maximum number of bonds to contain holdout problems.1 0 8 The acceptance rate also becomes substantially below
the effective rate of the prescribed threshold due to the manipulation of
CACs included.
F.

SIGNALING COSTS

Inclusion of CACs is a fairly recent phenomenon and has not yet received worldwide acceptance. Introducing such provisions in jurisdictions
that have not seen them might send a wrong signal to the market indicat104. Lee C. Buchheit, Choice of Law Clauses and Regulatory Statutes, 15 INT'L FIN. L.
REV. 11, 11-14 (1996).
105.

Id.

106. All four sovereigns-Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay, as well as those of
Belize, Ecuador, and Peru-have issued bonds which are governed by New York
laws, whereas the Russian bonds are governed by English laws.
107. Drage & Hovaguimian, supra note 32 at 5.
108. Scott, supra note 83.
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ing that the issuer already contemplates defaulting on its debt obligations
in the future. This may increase the cost of issuing new debt with CACs.
G.

ACCELERATION AND RESCISSION OF ACCELERATION

Acceleration is a contractual remedy that allows a creditor to declare
the full outstanding amount of the bond due and payable upon occurrence of an event of default. 1' 9 Restructured bonds may provide this
mandate to accelerate a bond upon a default based on a collective vote of
a prescribed percentage of the creditors.1 1 0 'Allowing a qualified majority to restrain the ability of a small group of bondholders to accelerate is
important particularly when an event of default is triggered by the crossdefault provision." ' If the bonds are issued under a trust structure, as in
the case of Argentina and Uruguay, the trustee has the considerable discretion to accelerate the entire issue on behalf of the bondholders in addition to being required to accelerate upon a collective vote.
A requisite percentage of creditors also have the option of reversing
the acceleration thus induced upon default. To determine the number of
creditors wvho could rescind the acceleration if the default was remedied
within a stipulated time. Mexico prescribed a simple percentage of more
than fifty percent. Brazil 66.67%. Argentina more than percent fifty percent. and Uruguay 66.67%; therefore, the ability of a collection of bondholders to rescind the acceleration could be of tactical importance to a
sovereign in a restructuring. For instance, Ecuador was able to reverse
the acceleration of its long-term bonds by paying interest arrears on its
old bonds. thus curing the default and eliminating the risk of litigation.112
If the issuer were able to amend these clauses in the restructured bond
and manipulate the prescribed majorities required for acceleration and
rescission of the acceleration, the bondholders negotiating capacity could
be considerablv diminished. Some of the jurisdictions like English law.
German law. and Japanese law do not contain a de-acceleration provision
113
in the (corporate) bonds governed under these laws.

H.

LEGAL ACTION

In its restructuring. Mexico and Brazil have employed a fiscal agent,
whereas Argentina and Uruguay issued their bonds with a trustee as a
permanent bondholder representative. This has an important impact on
109. Yan Liu. Collective Action Clauses in InternationalSovereign Bonds. International
Monetary Fund, 2002, available at http:/www.imf.org external/npleg sem2002

cdmfl engiu.pdf.
110. G-10:Working-Group. Report of the G-10 Working Group on Contractual
Clauses. Bank Of International Settlement, 2002. available at http:/'www.bis.org'
pubtgten08.htm.
111. Liu. supra note 109. at 10-11.
112. Timothy Geithner et. al. . Collective Action Clauses in Sovereign Bond ContractsEncouraging Greater Use. International Monetary Fund. 2002. available at http://

www .imf.orn external/np/psJ2002eng/060602.htm.

113. Liu. supra note 109, at 9.
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the non-participating bondholders' right to accelerate the bond in the
event of the sovereign's defaults. Under a fiscal agency system, each individual bondholder has a right to enforce his claim and seek payment that
is due if the sovereign defaults. But under a trust structure, the bondholder's right to enforce his claim is effectively delegated to the trustee. 11 4 Furthermore, in order for the trustee to initiate legal action
against the debtor, a certain percentage of bondholders as prescribed in
1 15
the contract must apply to the trustee.
Issuers include a provision in the exchange offer whereby participating
bondholders waive their rights to bring about any legal action for their
claims against the sovereign issuer. Bringing out legal enforcement
against the issuer may be a major impediment for a restructuring procedure, as was witnessed by the famous hold out cases against Peru. 116 The
New York Court of Appeals in Pravin Banker Assocs. balanced two principles to determine whether the court should decide in favor of the creditors regarding who had a rightful claim or for the new international
financial architecture being drawn by the restructuring process of Peru's
outstanding debts. 11 7 In another similar case, Elliott Assocs., the court of
appeals balanced similar issues and believed that investor protection was
a stronger priority." 8 By asking participating bondholders to surrender
their legal claims against the issuer, the debtor categorically stymies any
opportunity of a bondholder to seek legal protection if later on it is discovered that the interests of the bondholders have been significantly
hampered or the deal was mismanaged in some way.
I.

SHARING CLAUSE

One of the recommendations of the G-10 Working Group was to include a sharing clause whereby the litigation recovery proceeds of a successful hold-out creditor would be shared pro-rata by all the
bondholders. 1 19 Usually bonds are issued under a trust indenture where
the trustee is a permanent bondholder representative, and all claims in a
court of law have to be initiated through the trustee and claim proceeds
are then entrusted to the trustee who distributes it to the other bondholders. This means that even if anyone or a small group of bondholders were
to successful in their claim against their issuer, the proceeds of the judgment would be shared by all the existing bondholders, hence reducing the
incentive of that individual or that group of bondholders to invest in the
lawsuit all alone.
114. Id. at 4.
115. Typically twenty to twenty-five percent bondholders, employed by both Argentina
and Uruguay.
116. See generally Pravin Banker Assocs. v. Banco Popular del Peru, 109 F.3d 850, 85556 (2d Cir. 1997): Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Banco de la Nacion, 194 F.3d 363 (2d
Cir.1999).
117. Jose Garcia-Hamilton, et. al., The Required Threshold to Restructure Sovereign
Debt, 27 Loy. L. A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 249, 250-51 (2005).
118. Id.
119. G-10: Working-Group, supra note 110, at 2.
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J.

EMPIRICAL STUDIES

Sovereign defaults and debt restructuring are costly affairs and have
caused enormous losses to investors. The Argentine debt default of December 2001 was heralded as one of the largest sovereign default in history. By the time of the 2005 debt restructuring, the default involved
more than $100 billion of privately held debt ($81.8 billion in principal
plus $20 billion in past due interest) in the form of 152 different bonds.
Bondholders in Italy held $15.6 billion, the United States $9.1 billion, and
Japan $3.1 billion. 120 A substantial portion of the Argentine debt was
retail, by one estimate forty-four percent, held principally by individuals
in Italy and Germany. 121 Investor losses amounted to $67 billion for
those who accepted the restructuring and about $30 billion for those who
did not (because they could remain unpaid indefinitely); in total there
was a loss of $97 billion of public money. 122 The estimated haircut in the
Ecuadorian restructuring was about forty percent. 123 The Uruguay 2003
exchange targeted all its traded debt, which comprised almost its entire
sovereign debt portfolio. The securities eligible for exchange comprised
forty-six domestically issued bonds and treasury bills, accounting for $1.6
billion in principal; eighteen international bonds, accounting for $3.5 billion; and one "Samurai" bond issued in Japan, accounting for about $250
million. 24 The average net present value loss in the Uruguay restructur25
ing was thirteen percent.'
The Russian restructuring of 1999-2000 witnessed about fifty to sixty
percent average net present value haircut. 126 Considering the amount of
investor losses, serious empirical studies are required to estimate the economical impact of including CACs in sovereign bond contracts.
Experts hold the opinion that making provisions for orderly restructuring could render emerging market issues more attractive by minimizing
disputes, lengthy negotiations, and extended periods when no debt ser27
vice is paid and growth is depressed by a suffocating debt overhang.
Mechanisms of debt restructuring, which includes CACs, collective representation, and exit consents, have thus been lauded for their efficacy and
novelty. In order to reinforce this view, quite a few empirical studies
120. Scott, supra note 83, at 2.
121. Id. at 4.

122. Id. at 5.
123. Breaking The Mold, LatinFinance, Dec. 2005, at 23-24. The shortest instrumentsEurobonds and Brady Interest Equalization bonds-were exchanged at par, while
the longer dated Brady bonds were exchanged at 1:0.78 (PDI bonds), 1:0.58 (Dis-

count bonds) and 1:0.40 (Pars). Federico Sturzenegger & Jeromin Zettelmeyer,
Haircuts: Estimating Investor Losses in Sovereign Debt Restructurings, 1998-2005
27 (International Monetary Fund Working Paper WP/05/137, 2005).
124. Sturzenegger, supra note 123, at 49.

125. Id. at 4.
126. Id. at 9.
127. Barry Eichengreen and Ashoka Mody, Would Collective Action Clauses Raise Borrowing Costs? 2 (Center for International and Development Economics Research,
Paper COO-114, July 5, 2000) availableathttp://repositories.cdlib.org/iber/cider/COO114.
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have been carried out to analyze the economical implication of including
collective action clauses in loan contracts. Let us consider some of them
to see if they lend any credence to the threat that the CACs might pose to
investor protection.

1. Eichengreen & Mody128
The authors carried out their research in 1999 to study the implications
of including CACs in loan contracts. They studied a sample of around
2,000 international bonds and compared the spreads on bonds subject to
English law, which typically include collective action clauses, with spreads
on bonds subject to U.S. law, which do not. 129 They considered such factors as launch spreads over risk free rates, the amount of the issue, the
maturity in years, the governing law under which the bond contract was
written, currency of issue, etc. The authors claimed their research as "the
first systematic analysis of the impact on borrowing costs of collectiveaction clauses designed to facilitate the orderly restructuring of emerging130
market debt."
The research concluded with the following remarks:
The results caution that the impact of contract structure is discernible only when borrowers are disaggregated by credit quality. Results
for the whole sample disguise differential effects on borrowers with
better and worse credit ratings. Collective-action provisions tend to
reduce the cost of borrowing for the more credit-worthy issuers, who
benefit from being able to avail themselves of an orderly restructuring process. For less credit-worthy issuers, in contrast, there is evidence of higher spreads.
Although the authors did not discover any direct link between the inclusion of CACs in sovereign bonds, either governed by English or New
York law, and creditworthiness of the issuer, they were able to establish
that emerging markets with lower credit rating had higher borrowing
costs due to the inclusion of CACs. Considering that the study was carried out in 1999 and a lot has changed since then, it can be inferred that
emerging market sovereign debt issuers will definitely face some difficul3
ties in borrowing under CACs.' '
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 45. (The authors admit the same:
. .there is the possibility that the markets began to focus on the implications of collective action provisions only recently, and that they have therefore begun to price debt securities accordingly only
in recent quarters. Since the likelihood of default was low in the first half of the
1990s and the international policy community was not concerned to see that private investors 'took a hit,' there may have been no particular reason to focus on
the presence or absence of these provisions; since the inauguration of discussions
of private sector burden sharing, in contrast, legal protections have become a
prominent concern.").
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132
Gugiatti & Richards

Another relevant study was carried out by Gugiatti and Richards who
carried out their research primarily based on data from Euromarket and
US bond markets. The authors' paper sought to provide empirical evidence to the debate over the desirability of reforms to the way that financial markets and the international community dealt with sovereign debt
crises, particularly on the way that the use or non-use of CACs influenced
the pricing of debt. 33 They concluded that "even after the intense debate about sovereign debt restructuring through 2002, the inclusion or
absence of CACs still had no economically or statistically significant impact on yields as of early 2003," and that the inclusion of CACs was not
relevant to the pricing of debt. 134 Their study even included secondary
market data and found similar results.
Although Gugiatti & Richards establish that the market was indifferent
to the use of CACs in debt contracts, there is a possibility that the position might change in the near future. Considering that the CACs phenomenon is rather new, the implications of these provisions will become
more apparent only when they are used to amend bond terms at times of
crisis favorably for the debtor, for which CACs have been specifically
designed.
3.

13 5
Becker, Richards & Thaicharoen

A study similar to Gugiatti & Richards's was carried out by these authors in 2001. Predictably, they arrived at the similar results, that there
was no direct effect on pricing of the bonds with the use or non-use of
CACs in the bond contracts. Their research studied the pricing of bonds
with and without CACs using data for both primary and secondary market yields between 1999 and 2000. Becker et al's results even controvert
those of Eichengreen and Mody's results insofar as they find "no evidence in support of Eichengreen and Mody's finding that lower-rated
borrowers on average pay a premium of hundreds of basis points for bor136
rowing under English governing law with CACs".
4.

37
Sturzenegger & Zettelmeyer1

The authors conducted a study to calculate the investor losses ("haircuts") and recovery values in recent debt restructurings in Russia,
132. Mark Gugiatti & Anthony Richards, Do Collective Action Clauses Influence Bond
Yields? New Evidence From Emerging Markets (Reserve Bank of Australia,
Research Discussion Paper 2003-02, March 2003) available at http://www.rba.gov.
au/rdp/RDP2003-02.pdf.
133. Id. at 1.
134. Id. at 21.
135. Becker, Torbjorn, Anthony Richards & Yunyong Thaicharoen, Bond Restructuring
and Moral Hazard: Are Collective Action Clauses Costly? (Journal of
International Economics, IMF Working Paper WP/01/92, 2003).
136. Id. at 26.
137. Sturzenegger & Zettelmeyer, supra note 123.
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Ukraine, Pakistan, Ecuador, Argentina, and Uruguay. According to the
authors, [h]aircuts are computed as the percentage difference between
the present values of old and new instruments, discounted at the yield
prevailing immediately after the exchange. Recovery value means value
received in terms of outstanding principal."' 1 38 They find that the average
net present value of haircuts ranged from thirteen percent (Uruguay external exchange) to seventy-three percent (2005 Argentina exchange),
and the recovery rates ranged from 30 percent to about seventy-five
percent.
According to this study, Argentina's 2005 exchange was the most difficult restructuring with an average net present value haircut of almost seventy-five percent, and the mildest was Uruguay's international bond
exchange, with a haircut of only thirteen percent. Perhaps this has to do
with the innovative restructuring techniques employed by Uruguay as
against the enormous amount of debt of Argentina. Some of the important parameters identified by the authors in their study was the countries'
ability to pay, their willingness to pay, the bargaining power between the
creditor and the debtor, and most interestingly, inter-creditor equity and
legal equality among bondholders. 13 9 The latter two appear more significant for the purposes of this study because the scope of CACs will afford
room to the debtor countries for manipulating these two.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Whether or not an investor should participate in a sovereign debt restructuring will depend on various factors. One of them could be the
incentives of receiving more favorable terms by holding out, as opposed
to the definite loss incurred by a majority of participating investors. The
pay-off for an investor will clearly depend on an evaluation of the extent
to which a proposed deal protects their individual interests and the likely
payoffs of the alternative strategies in each case. 140 In making this decision, the investors should take into account the level of protection accorded to individual investors, the quality of assurance, inter-creditor
equity, and homogeneity among the instruments to be restructured. A
crucial role is also played by the probability that the debtor would service
the original claim, the likely market value of such a claim that is continuing to be serviced, and the likely risk and return of seeking to obtain
recoveries on the phased out debt instruments. 14 1 Litigation is not always
a glorious alternative for any holdout creditor. It is an expensive and
cumbersome redistribution procedure that is uncertain, and there are
hardly many assets of the sovereign vulnerable for attachment. In the
138. Id. at 41.
139. Id. at 49.
140. Franqois Gianviti, The Restructuring of Sovereign Debt-Assessing the Benefits,
Risks, and Feasibility of Aggregating Claims, Legal Department, International
Monetary Fund, at 7, 2003, available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/sdrm/
2003/090303.pdf.
141. Id.
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absence of sovereign insolvency procedures, there is the danger of a "race
to the courthouse," which benefits few investors at the expense of many.
Success of collective action provisions, as also that of the recourse to
legal remedies, could depend on the interpretation of sovereign default
itself. On one hand, a default can be viewed as simply the inability of a
sovereign to service its debt and fulfill its financial obligations. On the
other hand, one could argue that the financial distress of the sovereign
was due to squandering of credit, unplanned and mismanaged expenditure, faulty government policies, corruption, etc. The arguments for
CACs would dramatically change based on the view adopted, and in the
latter scenario, creditor legal enforcement rights must then be considered
pivotal for debtor discipline and containing debtor moral hazard. 142 For
example, the Argentinean default has been dubbed as the result of bad
14 3
policies which had contagion effect on other sovereigns.
Debt maturity and investor participation is essentially a market outcome, but sovereigns, especially emerging market borrowers, seem to behave in a myopic way. The most probable reaction is to meet the
immediate financing needs rather than to improve the debt profile and
sustainability. 144 The tardiness with which emerging markets handle their
debt profile only makes matters worse. A policy decision to announce a
default is taken after considerable delay, by which time investors have
already incurred huge losses. Most governments are highly influenced by
political motives and are not eager to employ long-term strategies to contain debt sustainability.
Some countries have been outspoken in their stand with regard to
CACs. Germany made an official statement in February 2000 stating that
although the government noticed no legal impediment to the use of
CACs issued under German law, all debt restructurings must conform to
the requirements of the Bondholders Act and operate under the limitations of the Civil Code. 145 An aggrieved bondholder may bring an action
on the grounds of undue disadvantage and principle of good faith. The
Japanese Commercial Code also has similar provisions for corporate
bond issues by public sector undertakings. Under Japanese law, issuing a
sovereign bond with CACs is not permitted, and amendment of financial
terms must be carried out with the approval of the court that will ensure
that creditor interests are duly protected.
In the name of improving the international financial architecture,
CACs are being promoted unabashedly in all sovereign debt issues, without analyzing their far reaching consequences. Such blatant use of CACs
could amount to a regime change and signal that bond restructuring
would now become a frequent phenomenon. 146 There is an urgent need
142. Haseler, supra note 30, at 12.
143. Stephane Colliac & Ion Lapteacru, Three Countries' Debt Profiles: Average Maturities in Mexico, Brazil, and Russia, J. OF MULTI. FIN. MANAG. 18, 94-111 (2008).
144. Id. at 95.
145. Liu, supra note 109, at 9.
146. Gugiatti & Richards, supra note 132, at 23.
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for an international legal infrastructure which can not only
judicious use of CACs, but also regulate and prevent abuse.
debt restructurings, with the use of CACs, were to continue
market standard, bondholders will soon be cornered and
submission.
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APPENDIX

147
TABLE A. COLLECTIVE ACTION CLAUSES IN UK DEBT:
G-10 Recommendation

Provision in UK US$ 3 bn. Note issue maturing in 2008
(Comparable provisions are included in the Bank of
England Euro Notes maturing in 2007)

Permanent bondholders' representative

The Trust Deed provides for the appointment of a permanent trustee to act in the best interests of the Noteholders
(including enforcement-see below).

Bondholders' negotiating
representative elected by ? of
bondholders

The ability to appoint a negotiating representative (or
committee) is provided in the Trust Deed.
Schedule 3, paragraph 18 (g) states:
"A meeting of the Noteholders shall ... have the following
powers exercisable by Extraordinary Resolution
namely... to appoint any person or persons (whether
Noteholders or not) as a committee or committees to
represent the interests of the Noteholders in any discussions with the Issuer or any other creditors of the Issuer in
connection with any proposed restructuring of the Notes or
other indebtedness of the Issuer and to confer upon such
committee or committees any powers or discretions which
the Noteholders could themselves exercise by Extraordinary Resolution."
Appointing a representative is not a reserved matter, so a
66.67 percent vote by principal outstanding is required by
Schedule 3 paragraph 20 (b) of the Trust Deed (see
below).

Bondholders meeting to be
convened at any time upon
request of Issuer, trustee, or
bondholders representing 10
percent of principal,

This is provided in the Trust Deed, under paragraph 2 of
Schedule 3 to the Trust Deed.
"The Issuer or the Trustee may at any time and the Issuer
shall upon a request in writing of Noteholders holding not
less than 10 percent in the aggregate of the principal
amount of the Notes for the time being outstanding convene a meeting of the Noteholders."
In the event of a meeting where a vote is taken, the quorum provisions in Schedule 3 paragraph 5 to the Trust
Deed are identical to the voting thresholds for any amendments, so meetings will never result in a lower voting
threshold.
"At any such meeting any person or persons . representing in the aggregate (a) in the case of a
meeting convened to consider an Extraordinary Resolution
relating to any Reserved Matter (as defined below), not
less than 75 percent; and (b) in the case of a meeting convened to consider any other Extraordinary Resolution, not
less than 66.67 percent of the principal amount of the
Notes for the time being outstanding shall form a quorum."

147. Summary Table-G10 Recommendations and UK CACs; MPRA Paper No. 6314
Collective Action Clauses in UK Debt, Bank of England Publication (2008),
available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/other/financialstability/
cac/index.htm.
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Majority action provisions
for amendments to reserved
matters and non-reserved
matters.
Voting is based on principal
outstanding, with a 75 percent threshold for reserved
matters and 66.67 percent
non reserved matters.
Votes can be conducted at a
meeting, or in writing.

Material amendments to the terms of the notes would be
classified as "Extraordinary resolutions", under the provisions of paragraph eighteen of Schedule 3 to the Trust
Deed.
"A meeting of the Noteholders shall . have the following
powers exercisable by Extraordinary Resolution namely:
(a) power to sanction any proposal by the Issuer for any
modification, abrogation, variation or compromise of, or
arrangement in respect of, the rights of the Noteholders
against the Issuer whether such rights shall arise under the
Notes or otherwise;
(b) power to sanction any proposal by the Issuer for the
exchange or substitution for the Notes of, or the conversion of the Notes into, other obligations or securities of the
Issuer or any entity formed or to be formed;
(c) power to assent to any modification of the provisions
contained in the Notes, the Conditions, this Schedule, the
Trust Deed or the Agency Agreement which shall be proposed by the Issuer . . (additional provisions d-g)"
Extraordinary resolutions are divided into reserved and
non-reserved matters, as set out in paragraph twenty of
Schedule 3 to the Trust Deed. Extraordinary resolutions
can be passed by votes taken at a meeting, or in writing.
"The expression Extraordinary Resolution means:
(a) in relation to any Reserved Matter (i) a resolution
passed at a meeting of the Noteholders duly convened and
held in accordance with the provisions contained herein by
a majority consisting of not less than 75 percent of the outstanding principal amount of the Notes for the time being
outstanding; or (ii) a resolution in writing signed by or on
behalf of holders of not less than 75 percent of the outstanding principal amount of the Notes for the time being
outstanding: and
(b) in relation to any other matter (i) a resolution passed
at a meeting of the Noteholders duly convened and held in
accordance with the provisions contained herein by a
majority consisting of not less than 66.76 percent of the
outstanding principal amount of the Notes for the time
being outstanding; or (ii) a resolution in writing signed by
or on behalf of holders of not less than 66.76 percent of
the outstanding principal amount of the Notes for the time
being outstanding."
The decisions taken by these majority voting procedures
are binding all on bondholders, as provided in paragraph
91 of Schedule 3 to the Trust Deed.
"An Extraordinary Resolution passed at a meeting of the
Noteholders duly convened . or passed by resolution in
writing shall be binding upon all the Noteholders, whether
present or not present at any such meeting and whether
they voted in favor or not."
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Reserved matters
(For details, see p. 10 of the
G1O Working Group's
Report)

The reserved matters include those points specified in the
G10 Report, but also go slightly wider to include matters
such as any changes to governing law, the status of the
notes (including pari passu), and the events of default. The
full list of reserved matters is provided in paragraph 21 of
Schedule 3 to the Trust Deed (and also in the Offering
Circular under Condition 8).
-For the purposes of this Trust Deed, a Reserved Matter is
any proposal to:
(i) postpone the date of maturity of any of the Notes or
any date for payment of interest thereof;
(ii) reduce or cancel the principal amount of the Notes;
(iii) reduce the rate of interest payable in respect of the
Notes;
(iv) vary the currency or place of payment in which any
payment in respect of the Notes is to be made;
(v) amend the status of Notes under Condition 2 (Status);
(vi) amend the obligation of the Issuer to pay additional
amounts under Condition 6 (Taxation) and the Trust Deed;
(vii) amend the Events of Default set out in Condition 7
(Events of Default);
(viii) amend the law governing the Notes and the Trust
Deed referred to in Condition 17 (Governing Law);
(ix) modify the provisions contained in this Schedule concerning the quorum required at any meeting of the Noteholders or any adjournment thereof or concerning the
majority required to pass an Extraordinary Resolution or
the percentage of votes required for the taking of any
action;
(x) change the definition of "outstanding" in the Trust
Deed;
(xi) authorize the Trustee, on behalf of all Noteholders, to
exchange or substitute the Notes for, or convert the Notes
into, other obligations or securities of the Issuer or any
other person;
(xii) instruct the Trustee, on behalf of all Noteholders, to
withdraw, settle or compromise any proceeding or claim
asserted by the Trustee pursuant to Condition 7 (Events of
Default);
(xiii) give to any person or group of persons, other than
the Trustee or the Appointee, the exclusive right to
enforce any provision of the Trust Deed or the Notes on
behalf of all Noteholders after the Noteholders have
become entitled to proceed directly against the Issuer in
accordance with Clause 8.2 of the Trust Deed and Condition 9;
(xiv) confer upon any committee or committees appointed
pursuant to paragraph 81(g) any powers or discretions
which the Noteholders could themselves exercise by
Extraordinary Resolution;
(xv) amend this definition in any manner."
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Majority enforcement:
-acceleration on instruction
by bondholders representing
25 percent of principal;
-litigation to be instituted by
the trustee or on instruction
by bondholders representing
25 percent of principal

The Trust Deed provides the same enforcement provisions
for both acceleration and litigation, through Clause 8 on
Proceedings, Action and Indemnification.
"The Trustee shall not be bound to take any action or proceedings mentioned in Condition 7 [Event of Default specified in the Offering Circular] .. unless respectively
directed or requested to do so (i) by an Extraordinary
Resolution or (ii) in writing by the holders of at least 25
percent in principal amount of the Notes then outstanding ... Only the Trustee may enforce the provisions of this
Trust Deed. No Note-holder shall be entitled to proceed
directly against the Issuer to enforce the performance of
any of the provisions of this Trust Deed unless the Trustee
having become bound as aforesaid to take proceedings
fails to do so within 90 days and such failure is continuing."
The Events of Default that give rise to acceleration are
specified in Condition 7 of the Offering Circular, which
also forms part of the terms and conditions under the
Trust Deed.
"If any of the following events (each an "Event of
Default") occurs and is continuing, the Trustee may at its
discretion, and if so requested in writing by holders of at
least 25 percent in principal amount of the Notes then outstanding or if so directed by an Extraordinary Resolution ... give notice to H.M. Treasury that the principal
amount of each Note shall mature and become immediately due and payable, together with accrued interest:
(a) H.M. Treasury shall default for a period of seven days
or more in the payment on the due date of any principal
due on the Notes or any of them or for a period of 51
days or more in the payment on the due date of any interest due in respect of the Notes or any of them: or
(b) H.M. Treasury shall default in the performance of any
other covenant contained in the Notes or the Trust Deed
which default is incapable of remedy or, if in the opinion
of the Trustee capable of remedy, is not in the opinion of
the Trustee remedied 03 days after written notice thereof
shall have been given to H.M. Treasury by the Trustee,
provided that in the case of an event falling within paragraph (b), the Trustee shall have certified that in its opinion such event is materially prejudicial to the interests of
Noteholders."
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Majority enforcement: rescission of acceleration upon
decision of bondholders representing 66.67 percent of
principal outstanding

The bonds include terms for the rescission of acceleration,
and go slightly wider by providing for the rescission of litigation as well. The threshold for both requires the agreement
of Noteholders representing 75 percent of principal outstanding-slightly higher than the 66 ? percent noted in the
G10 proposal. This is because decisions on enforcement are
included as a reserved matter given their significance, see
sub-paragraph (xii) in paragraph 21 of Schedule 3 to the
Trust Deed.
"For the purposes of this Trust Deed, a Reserved Matter is
any proposal to ... (xii) instruct the Trustee, on behalf of
all Noteholders. to withdraw, settle or compromise any proceeding or claim asserted by the Trustee pursuant to Condition 7 (Events of Default)."

Majority enforcement: prorate
distribution of proceeds

This is provided in the Trust Deed, under Clause 9-Application of Monies.
"All moneys received by the Trustee under this Trust Deed
from the Issuer... shall... be apportioned without priority
and ratably between each series of the Notes, and all moneys received by the Trustee under this Trust Deed from the
Issuer to the extent attributable in the opinion of the Trustee to a particular series of the Notes..
(a) First in payment or satisfaction of all amounts then due
and unpaid under Clauses 14 and/or 150) to the Trustee
and/or any Appointee;
(b) Secondly in or towards payment without priority and
ratably of all principal and interest then due and unpaid in
respect of the Notes of that series;
(c) Thirdly in or towards payment without priority and ratably of all principal and interest then due and unpaid in
respect of the Notes of each other series; and
(d) Fourthly in payment of the balance (if any) to the Issuer
(without prejudice to, or liability in respect of, any question
as to how such payment to the Issuer shall be dealt with as
between the Issuer and any other person)."

Disenfranchisement provision-that excludes the Issuer
from participating in any
votes,

This is provided in the Trust Deed, Clause 1-under the definition of "outstanding".
"[Ojutstanding means, in relation to the Notes. all the Notes
delivered pursuant to this Trust Deed ... provided that for
each of the following purposes, namely:
(i) the right to attend at any meeting of the holders of the
Notes of any series, to vote on any resolution put to Noteholders or, as a Noteholder, to give any instruction or direction to the Trustee;
(ii) the determination of whether the Noteholders of the
requisite principal amount of outstanding Notes are present
at a meeting of Noteholders for quorum purposes or have
consented to or voted in favor of any request, demand,
authorization, direction, notice, consent, waiver, amendment,
modification or supplement hereunder;
(iii) any discretion, power or authority (whether contained
in this Trust Deed or vested by operation of law) which the
Trustee is required, expressly or impliedly, to exercise in or
by reference to the interests of the holders of the Notes; and
(iv) the determination by the Trustee whether any event, circumstance, matter or thing is, in its opinion, materially prejudicial to the interests of the holders of the Notes, the
Notes owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the
Issuer or by any public body owned or controlled, directly
or indirectly, by the Issuer shall be disregarded and deemed
not to be outstanding."

Information provision-to be
included on a case-by-case
basis

Not included.
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TABLE B. COLLECTIVE ACTION CLAUSES: G-10
RECOMMENDATIONS AND BONDS ISSUED UNDER NEW

YORK LAW SINCE MARCH

2005148

Provisions

G-10 Recommendations

Argentina, Brazil, Colombia,
Dominican Republic, El
Salvador, Indonesia, Italy,
Lebanon, Mexico, Peru,
Philippines, Turkey,
Uruguay, & Venezuela

Amendment of Key Terms

75 percent threshold based
on either outstanding
principal or principal held
by those present at a duly
convened meeting.

75 percent based on
outstanding principal (except
the Lebanon bond, where
the threshold is based on
duly convened meeting).

Aggregate Voting

None.

Argentina, Dominican
Republic, and Uruguay: 85
percent of the aggregate
outstanding principal of all
affected series (taken in
aggregate) and 66.67 percent
of outstanding principal of
each affected series (taken
individually).

Disenfranchisement

Bonds owned or controlled
directly or indirectly by the
issuer or its public sector
instrumentalities,

Generally bonds owned
directly or indirectly by the
issuer or its public sector
instrumentalities.

Acceleration

25 percent of outstanding
principal,

25 percent of outstanding
principal (except the
Lebanon bond, where each
bondholder has the right to
accelerate upon default).

De-acceleration

Between 50 and 66.67
percent of outstanding
principal.

• Argentina, Colombia,
Dominican Republic,
Indonesia, Mexico, Peru,
Philippines and Venezuela:
50 percent of outstanding
principal.
e Uruguay: 66 percent of the
outstanding principal.
* Brazil, El Salvador, Italy
and Turkey: 66.67 percent of
outstanding principal
* Lebanon: none.

Initiation of Proceedings

• Mandate the use of a trust
or an equivalent legal
structure where the trustee
can be instructed by 25
percent to initiate lawsuits.
* Pro rata distribution of
recovered proceeds under
trust structure.
-

Individual bondholder,
except the Argentina,
Dominican Republic,
Indonesia, and Uruguay
bonds where the trustee has
a limited monopoly over
initiation of proceedings
whose recovery would be
I distributed pro rata.

148. International Monetary Fund, Progress Report on Crisis Resolution (Sept. 21,
2005) available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2005/092105.htm.
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Engagement Provision

* Appoint a bondholder
representative for the life of
the bond.
* 66.67 percent to appoint at
any time any person to
represent all holders in
negotiation with the issuer
or other creditors.

None.

Information Provision

A covenant requiring the
issuer to provide certain
types of information over
the life of the bond and
following a default.

None.

Documentation

Trust or an equivalent legal
structure.

Fiscal agency agreement,
except Argentina,
Dominican Republic,
Indonesia, and Uruguay
which utilized a trust
structure.
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TABLE C. COMPARISON OF THE G10 RECOMMENDATIONS
WITH THE PROPOSALS MADE BY A GROUP OF SEVEN
14 9
TRADE ASSOCIATIONS
G10 Recommendations for
New York law bonds

Trade Associations'
proposals for New York law
bonds

Market practice - in bonds
issued by Mexico (and
others)

Permanent bondholders'
representative (trustee or
other).

No - fiscal agent, who
represents the issuer.

Trade Associations. Fiscal
agent in all recent NY law
issues except Uruguay.

Bondholders' negotiating
representative elected by ?
of Bondholders.

The 'engagement clause'
provides, in the event of
default or restructuring, for
bondholders to elect a
representative committee (or
individual) with votes from
50 percent of bondholders,
unless more than 25 percent
object.
The representative(s) could
engage legal counsel and
financial advisors and the
issuer would pay for the
costs.

Neither. No provision for
representation (as far as
aware).

149. Drage & Hovaguimian, supra note 32 (compiled variously from data obtained
from: IPMA, 11F, EMCA, EMTA, SIA, ISMA, and TBMA; The Report of the G10 Working Group on Contractual Clauses was published in March 2003 and can
be found at: http://www.bis.org/publ/gten08.htm#pgtop. The trade associations'
proposals were circulated in January 2003 and are available at: http://www.emta.
org/ndevelop/Final-merged.pdf).
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